Abstract: The paper analyses the place of the army of the Principality of Serbia in the plans of liberation and unification of the Serbian and South Slavic peoples in the mid-19th century. While the plans created in the 1840s and 1850s – the Načertanije of 1844 being the most important, referred to the historical right and the military option was not explicitly examined, after the establishment of the national army in 1861, the military forces of the Principality – the national army, with around 100,000 soldiers and the standing army with around 3,000 soldiers – were increasingly taken into account. The majority of plans from the 1860s considered either the organisation and support to the uprisings of the subjugated Christians, or a union of the Balkan states against the Ottoman Empire.

Keywords: Principality of Serbia, national army, Načertanije, plans, Ilija Garašanin, Prince Mihailo, Matija Ban, Atanasije Nikolić.

A lot has been written about the national policy of the Principality of Serbia of the mid-19th century in historiographic literature, particularly about Ilija Garašanin’s Načertanije, the most important Serbia’s foreign policy programme of the 19th century. The revolutionary developments of 1848/49 and the Crimean War (1853–1856), particularly the processes of Italian and German unification (the war of Sardinia and France against Austria of 1859 and the Austro-Prussian War of 1866), and the recurring Eastern Question, encouraged politicians in Serbia to think about the expansion of the Serbian state and unification of the Serbian people or South Slavic
peoples. Whether Serbia’s military forces from the 1840s to the late 1860s were adequate for the objectives defined and to what extent they were, in fact, counted on in resolving the Serbian national question, is something to be discussed in this paper. While on power, Prince Mihailo, Serbia’s ruler (1839–1842; 1860–1868), and Ilija Garašanin (1812–1874), one of the most eminent politicians of the 19th century, gave impetus to the policy of liberation and unification. After the deposal of Ilija Garašanin in late 1867 and the murder of Prince Mihailo in June 1868, the policy of the Principality of Serbia took another course.2

At the start, we shall present several facts about the status, political organisation and economic strength of the Principality of Serbia in the mid-19th century. Serbia was de iure an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire, obliged to pay to the Porte the annual tribute of 2.3 million groschen, or around 10% of its budget.3 The country’s autonomy was also constrained by the presence of the Ottoman army in fortifications. Despite these constraints, Serbia enjoyed a high degree of internal self-governance. The Constitution of 1838 established a specific political system where the power of the ruler – prince, was limited. The Council became the most important political body, with the prerogatives of legislative and, to a considerable extent, executive power. The political conflict between the Prince and the Council over supremacy in the central government marked the rule of Prince Aleksandar in 1842–1858. The legacy of the Defenders of the Constitution regime was visible in the organisation of courts, establishment of the educational system, and the creation of the bureaucratic apparatus and the police state.4 After the return of the Obrenović Dynasty to the throne in 1858, the laws of 1861 limited the powers of the Council and reinforced the ruler’s rights. The regime of Prince Mihailo was established and can be compared with the regimes of Enlightened Absolutism.5

From 1833 to 1878, the Principality of Serbia occupied 37.740 km². In 1863, it had 1,108,668 inhabitants, of whom 91.2% in villages and 8.8% in towns. Agriculture was the main economic branch. The mid-19th century saw a dynamic transition process of the abolishment of feudal and establishment of capitalistic relations. The Civil Code of 1844 defined the inalienability of private ownership. According to the census of 1866, an average land estate had 3.83 hectares. Animal husbandry, particularly swine breeding,

3 Кристина Павловић, Буџети Кнежевине Србије од 1844. до 1858. године, необјављени мастер рад, Филозофски факултет, Београд 2017, 158–160.
4 С. Јовановић, Уставобранитељи и њихова влада 1838–1858, Београд 1925, 9–111; Владимир Јовановић, Тајна полиција Кнежевине Србије (политичко насиље и управљачке стратегије у Србији 19. века), Београд 2012, 58–79.
5 С. Јовановић, Друга влада Милоша и Михаила, 145–166.
was the main branch of agriculture, in respect of which Serbia held the first place in Europe. Despite the widespread belief, particularly present in Western European historiography, 68.8% of families were nuclear and 16.7% lived in cooperatives.

In such, briefly outlined, political and social circumstances, the army was established in the Principality of Serbia. Until the start of the 1880s, with interruptions, standing troops and the national army (the militia) existed in parallel. The laws on the army passed in 1839, 1841, 1845, 1860, 1861 and 1864 indirectly testify to its dynamic development in the vassal principality in the mid-19th century. During the autocratic rule of Prince Miloš (1815–1839), the standing troops, established in 1825, were considered a strong support of the regime, and in May and June 1839, the opposition – the Defenders of the Constitution, dissolved the standing troops and embarked on new organisation pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of 1838. In line with the main intention of the Constitution, which strengthened the Porte’s influence in the Principality of Serbia, the army’s primary task was to maintain the internal order in the country. The so-called “Garnizono vojinstvo” (Garrison Army), i.e. standing troops, constituted Serbia’s main military force from 1839 to 1861. The supreme command over the standing troops formally belonged to the ruler, but, essentially, the management and organisation fell under the remit of the Minister of Interior, to whom the head of the Military Department was directly accountable. Thus, the Minister of Interior led the entire repressive state apparatus – its police and the army, for entire twenty years. The dynastic and political conflicts which reverberated across Serbia, particularly in 1842, weakened the army. When the circumstances calmed, from the mid-‘40s, more attention was paid to the organisation of the standing army. Under the Law of 1845, the standing army could have 2,010 infantrymen, 250 artilleryman, 208 cavalrymen, and 50
musicians, i.e. 2,518 soldiers.\textsuperscript{12} Even so scarce in numbers, a half of the standing army was subjected to the barracks regime each three months (the military service lasted four years) and a half was on the leave. The Law of 1860 stipulated 3,529 soldiers in the standing army, and an auxiliary unit of 250 persons. As it was ascertained that this number of soldiers was insufficient, in early 1860, a “gendarmerie” unit was formed, consisting of 120 infantrymen and 15 cavalrymen, located in Belgrade.\textsuperscript{13} The outlays for the standing army significantly burdened the state budget. The costs of the Ministry of Interior (1850–1857) averaged 48% of all state expenditure, of which 40% went to the army. In the 1850s, 1/8 of the state budget was earmarked for the military budget.\textsuperscript{14} In the public discourse of the Principality in the mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century, the standing troops were considered a part of a much stronger military force – the people. The awareness about the military spirit of the Serbian people, who gained freedom after clashing with the Ottoman Empire in the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century, was maintained and nurtured until the second half of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{15}

However, the Revolution in the Austrian Empire in 1848/49, when Serbia was helping its compatriots on the left bank of the Sava and Danube rivers, revealed the chronic lack of armament and educated officers in the Principality.\textsuperscript{16} That is why the Cannon Foundry was established in Belgrade in 1848, and the Artillery School two years later. In 1850, the Cannon Foundry was moved to Kragujevac and after years-long preparations, the production of artillery weapons began in October 1853. Until late 1857, excluding 1855 when cannons were not cast, over 80 cannons were produced.\textsuperscript{17} In the early 1860s, the production facilities of the Cannon Foundry were expanded. By the Law on the Artillery Administration of 1862, the production and warehousing capacities were joined under a single administration, while Kragujevac,

\textsuperscript{13} Ibidem, 20.
\textsuperscript{14} К. Павловић, op. cit., 179–180; Карл Пацек, Погледи на Кнежевину Србију, Нови Сад 1851, 24.
\textsuperscript{15} This is confirmed by a note in the state calendar for 1852. “In our homeland, the military is being organised based on the national military spirit. (…) The military spirit of the Serbian people (…) is finding a good direction in the regular army because this direction will show them the path to be taken in any military deed and endeavour. It is therefore very good that the people have such a military school, where they are developing their military and courageous spirit, and are thus being directed to the proper track” (Велики београдски календар за годину 1852. са шематизмом Кнежества Србије, Београд 1852, 29–30).
\textsuperscript{16} Around 12,000 volunteers from Serbia led by county and district heads, i.e. police authorities, commanded by state advisor Stevan Petrović Knjićanin, participated in the Serbian movement in Hungary (Јован Ристић, Спољашњи односи Србије. Србија и српски покрет у Угарској 1848. до 1849, Гласник Српског ученог друштва 55 (1884) 52). By the Council’s decision in November 1848, 2,700 rifles, which were somewhat earlier dispatched to Serbia, were sent to the Serbs in Vojvodina (АС, ДС, 1848/378).
\textsuperscript{17} Александар Стаматовић, Војни произвођач погони, прва савремена индустрија у Србији (1804–1878), ПИНУС Записи 6 (1997) 147.
the former capital of the Principality, became the military centre of Serbia. In those years, the contemporary technology of the production of grooved artillery barrels was adopted. There are no precise data, but it is estimated that up to one hundred artillery cannons were produced in the ‘60s in Kragujevac.18

The lack of contemporary rifles was one of the main problems of the Serbian army in the mid-19th century. Serbia was procuring rifles in Austria, Russia, Belgium, Prussia and France, but faced difficulties due to shortages in the state budget and strong resistance of the great powers, which observed its armament with mistrust.19 In terms of armament, Serbia was unprepared for the Turkish bombardment of Belgrade in 1862. During the summer and autumn of 1862, the total of 110,607 rifles of twelve different calibres (14.4–18 mm) were recorded in the Principality. Of this, there were only 7,000 modern rifles procured in Belgium in the late ‘50s.20 Owing to Russia, which gratuitously gave to Serbia 39,200 rifles that were dispatched to Serbia in the winter of 1862/63 after many complications, the situation somewhat improved.21

An important role in the military strengthening of Serbia was played by the gunpowder magazine in Stragari, where gunpowder was produced during the First Serbian Uprising and the first rule of Prince Miloš. It was only in the mid-19th century that production capacities were developed.22

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1845</th>
<th>1847</th>
<th>1849</th>
<th>1855</th>
<th>1856</th>
<th>1859</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>kg of gunpowder</td>
<td>3,284</td>
<td>12,951</td>
<td>41,027</td>
<td>19,709</td>
<td>56,135</td>
<td>40,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>1860</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>1864</td>
<td>1866</td>
<td>1867</td>
<td>1869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kg of gunpowder</td>
<td>68,100</td>
<td>30,520</td>
<td>3,920</td>
<td>58,020</td>
<td>71,760</td>
<td>22,350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Production of gunpowder in the gunpowder magazine in Stragari in the mid-19th century23

18 А. Стаматовић, op. cit., 155, 164. The percentage of the Artillery Administration budget in the total military budget was 15–20% in 1863–1867 (Ibidem, 164).
19 During Serbia’s defence preparations for the war against Austria in 1854, 7,000–8,000 obsolete rifles were distributed to the people from military warehouses. Around 6,000 pieces remained in warehouses (Никола Христић, Мемоари 1840–1862, Београд 2006, 410).
21 Of the total batch of rifles received from Russia, model М.1845 of 18.03 mm calibre accounted for 36,200, and the model M. 1854 of 17.78 mm calibre for 3,000 pieces (Д. Леовац, op. cit., 105–106).
23 Бож. Крстић, Државна барутана у Страгарима, Београд 1897, 122–123.
The Artillery School founded in 1850 – since 1880 officially called the Military Academy, is the oldest military-educational institution in Serbia. Until 1869, seven classes, i.e. 91 officers were educated there. Despite the efforts to educate own officer cadre, the lack of educated officers was one of the main problems of the Serbian army, not only in the mid-19th century, but until the late 19th century as well. There were five–six senior officers from Serbia who were educated in foreign military schools, including eminent generals Jovan Belimarković and Ranko Alimpić. In the 1860s, Prince Mihailo received around 20 officers, mainly of Serbian origin, from the Austrian army.

The scarcity of the standing army, huge expenses for its maintenance, and the awareness that it was necessary to strengthen the country’s military potentials were a problem that the Serbian government in the mid-19th century found difficult to resolve. Already from the mid-1840s, there were the first attempts to establish the militia on lawful grounds. The danger of Austria’s attack on Serbia during the Crimean War impacted on the implementation of serious preparations for the organisation of the militia. The administrative division of the Principality into 17 counties, and counties into districts, was the basis for the organisation of the militia on the territorial principle. A census was carried out of men aged from 18 to 45 who were covered by the military service, and of draught animals. Furthermore, food reserves were stored across Serbia and there was a failed attempt to procure arms abroad. Through accelerated courses, the veterans of the standing army were promoted to sub-officers and officers. According to mobilisation lists, Serbia could count on 96,476 people. As the war did not break out, preparations were halted, but the experience gained in the organisation of the militia in 1854 was applied seven years later.

24 Споменица пединогоодишнине Војне академије 1850–1900, Београд 1901; Божица Младеновић, Милић Ј. Милићевић, Питомци Војне академије, списак свршених питомца 1–46 класе 1855–1914, Београд 2012, 89. Some officers from Serbia were referred to education abroad, to Russia, Prussia, France and Belgium.

25 Новица Ракочевић, Ратни планови Србије против Турске (од вожда Карађорђа до краља Петра), Београд 1933, 75. The heads of the Military Department, even the ministers of the military, came from abroad: Ivan Danilović, a former Russian officer of Serbian origin (1840–1842); Kosta Hranisavljević, a former Austrian officer of Serbian origin (1845–1857; 1861). The most interesting was the appointment of Frenchman Hippolyte Mondain as the head of the Military Staff (1861–1862) and the Minister of the Army (1862–1865).

26 In late 1845, the Ministry of Interior proposed that a reserve be formed out of the veteran soldiers of the standing army (АС /hereinafter: Архив Србије/, Државни Савет /hereinafter: ДС/, 1846, 47). In April 1848, the Ministry of Interior re-launched the initiative to organise the national army by the territorial principle. In October 1848, the Council refused the proposal (АС, ДС, 1850, 11).

27 Jeremija Mitrović, Organizacija i oprema narodne vojske u Kneževini Srbiji 1854. godine, Vesnik 5/II (1958) 183–204.

28 According to lists, the infantry would have 86,325 soldiers, 3,648 cavalrymen, 3,451 artillerymen, 2,032 women and 1,020 persons in the medical corps (АС, фонд Драгослава Страњаковића (несређена грађа), фасцикла 1, списак 4, бр. 123).
After the return of the Obrenovićs in 1858, a new phase in the political history of Serbia took place. Princes Miloš and Mihailo put an end to the Turkophile policy of the previous government. The eviction of the Muslim population from Serbia – the obligation the Porte had to fulfil according to the hatt-i sharifs from the ’30s, the restoration of the hereditary ruling right to the Obrenović Dynasty, the reliance on Russia, and the clearly expressed intention to liberate compatriots from the Ottoman rule, were the indicators of the new political course. To achieve these ambitious objectives, it was necessary to build the army on new foundations. At the start of his rule, in 1860, Prince Mihailo was thinking about increasing the number of the standing army to 12,000 persons, but gave up on this intention due to the high costs of its maintenance. The law on the militia of August 1861 solved the burning problem – how to maintain the relatively numerous army with minimal expenses. The ideological premise that “the entire people is the army”, i.e. that the people, and not only the state, should give a contribution and sacrifice to the military organisation of the country, was enshrined in that Law. The task of the army was to defend the country and “maintain the rights of the Principality”. Serbia’s all male citizens aged from 20 to 50 were subject to the military service. Conscripts would procure food and clothes on their own. They had to procure arms as well, but this obligation was undertaken by the state, which sustained officers, veterans in the reserve and military plants (the Cannon Foundry, gunpowder magazines, warehouses...). The militia was divided into two classes – the first, which could be mobilised instantly (aged 20–35), and the second class (aged 35–50), to be engaged when needed. The militia was divided into the infantry, cavalry and artillery. According to estimates, the first class would have 45,840 infantrymen, 2,647 cavalrymen, 1,200 cannoneers and 985 pioneers, i.e. 17 regiments, 62 battalions, 26 squadrons and six batteries. In addition the militia, the units of the standing army continued to exist. The establishment of the militia was, in fact, contrary to the vassal position of the Principality of Serbia, but in line with the ambitious policy pursued by Prince Mihailo.

In the 1860s, significant efforts were invested in the procurement of armament and equipment, and the training of the militia. A fourth and, in some years a third of...
total government expenditure went to the army and military needs. Despite considerable financial expenses, the assessments of contemporaries, particularly foreign observers, about the combat readiness of the army were not positive. For instance, Italian colonel de Sonnaz, who stayed in Serbia in 1864, and Italian consul in Serbia Scovasso, emphasised the unpreparedness of Serbia’s national army for any serious military conflict. The report of Milivoje Petrović Blaznavac, the Minister of the Military, which he submitted to Russian military agent Franchini in Constantinople in spring 1867, shows that after six-year preparations, the Serbian army consisted of 80 infantry battalions with 500–600 persons (44,000 in total), the cavalry divided into 33 squadrons with 120 persons each (around 4,000), and the artillery distributed into 43 batteries with 258 cannons. The auxiliary units for the transportation of materiel consisted of 5,000 carts, organised into the companies of 80–120 men. According to this report, the army had 62,000 rifles of 17.8 mm calibre, and 45,000 rifles of 13.8 mm calibre. Soon after this report, the Russian military mission, which came to Serbia in May 1867, ascertained that the Serbian army lacked 170 officers and sub-officers, mainly in the artillery. Despite intensive and expensive preparations, the militia was simply not prepared for offensive operations against the Ottoman Empire, though established for those very purposes.

In the plans of statesmen of the Principality of Serbia created in the mid-19th century, which examined the idea of national liberation and unification, as already

33 Total government expenditure for the budget year of 1861/62 equalled 22,016,773 groschen. The expenses for the “Main military administration, the army and military institutes” equalled 7,126,307.20 groschen (АС, ДС, 1861, 908). The share of the military budget in the total budget of the Principality of Serbia ranged between 35% and 25% from 1862/63 to 1868/69 (Д. Леовац, op. cit., 236). Due to the crisis triggered by the Turkish bombardment of Belgrade in 1862, total 2,411,510 groschen were earmarked for extraordinary military expenses, and the total budget deficit in that year was 6,178,829 groschen (Ж. Ђорђевић, op. cit., 105–107). According to some calculations, the outlays for the army of the Principality of Serbia in 1862–1868 ranged between as much as 58% and 69% of total government expenditure (Љуба Поповић, Мић Милићевић, Министри војни Кнежевине и Краљевине Србије 1862–1918, Београд 1998, 31–32).


35 In the same report, Minister of the Army Blaznavac emphasised that the burning issues were the lack of horses for the artillery, provision of food supply for 80,000 soldiers, absence of the military cadre and contemporary rifles (Д. Леовац, op. cit., 223–224).

36 Ж. Ђорђевић, op. cit., 163. Ilija Garašanin observed the formation of the militia with resignation. “There are not sufficient people even for an army of three thousand people to be adequately maintained, and we wanted to have, all at once, a militia of one hundred thousand people, who are by all means harder and more complicated to manage than 3,000 regular soldiers. There is the example of our standing army which wears out so many people without even nurturing a good military spirit. When this is the case with two–three thousand people, what will happen with one hundred thousand?” (АС, фонд Илије Гарашанина /hereinafter: ИГ/, 1310).
determined in historiographic literature, we distinguish between two periods: the 1840/50s and the 1860s. References to the historical right were prevalent in the first period. The Ottoman Empire was expected to soon collapse and Serbia was to restore its state in the size it had in the Middle Ages. The underlying assumption was such that in the mayhem caused by the conflict of the great powers over the Eastern Question, an opportunity to fulfil the objective would emerge. The historicism fostered from the second half of the 18th century, adjusted to the new circumstances, found its place in the Načertanije of Ilija Garašanin of 1844. The Načertanije rests on the belief that Russia and Austria would divide the Ottoman estates in Europe, or that Serbia, aided by France and Great Britain, would restore the Serbian medieval empire, which would be an obstacle to the Russian and Austrian domination in the Balkans. Serbia had to inform itself about the position of its compatriots and other oppressed peoples, and prepare itself for the moment of collapse of the Ottoman rule, or, in convenient circumstances, it would “tear” and annex the Ottoman territory a bit by bit. Propaganda, i.e. the creation of beliefs about Serbia’s liberation mission, and the spreading of the cultural influence on the surrounding peoples were the means of soft power to be deployed first and foremost. The Načertanije does not explicitly mention the war option. The fact that


39 The Načertanije of Ilija Garašanin of 1844; the plan of Konstantin Nikolajević of 1848; the plan initiated in 1853 by British Consul in Belgrade Fonblanque and accepted by Garašanin – about the redefining of Serbia’s autonomous position and territorial expansion; the proposal of Aleksa Janković which he submitted to Russian diplomat Orlov in Vienna in 1854, about the creation of an independent kingdom of Serbia; the plan of President of the Council Stefan Stefanović Tenka about the “Serbian empire”, also from 1854; and Jovan Marinović’s plan about an independent Serbian kingdom from the same year, presented to French officials (М. Јагодић, Србија и Стара Србија 1839–1868: Наслеђе на југу, Београд 2016, 81–108). Also see: Р. Љушић, Предлози Јована Мариновића за решавање српског питања 1848. и 1854. године, Српске студије 3 (2012) 279–312.

40 In broader terms, the referral to the historical right had the dominant place in plans and analyses of Serbian public figures from the second half of the 18th century and the first decades of the 19th century (Р. Љушић, Историја српске државности. Србија и Црна Гора – нововековне српске државе, II, Нови Сад 2001, 117–124; Михаил В. Белов, У истоков сербской национальной идеологии, механизмы формирования и специфика развития XVIII–XIX века, Санкт Петербург 2007, 90–136; М. Јагодић, Србија и Стара Србија, 81–83.

41 It was first necessary to collect information about the position of the people in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and “Northern Albania”, and then in Slavonia, Croatia, Dalmatia, Srem, Banat and Bačka, enable the education of the Bulgarians in Serbia, print liturgical and other books in Bulgarian, and work in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the overcoming of religious differences between the Orthodox, Catholics and Muslims.
it was counted on can be indirectly concluded from the part of the text where the agents of Serbian propaganda were entrusted with collecting data on the military strength of the people, the Ottoman and Austrian armies, their warehouses and armament, production of war supplies and their transport. Also emphasised was the strategic-military importance of Montenegro, “which it will always have, once endeavours are made to separate Bosnia and Herzegovina from Turkey and join them to Serbia”. By granting regular financial aid to the Montenegrin Prince, Serbia “will secure at a small cost the friendship of the country which can place at disposal at least 10,000 mountain troops”.

Given the postulates contained in the Načertanije and the military organisation of the Principality, it is understandable that the idea about an uprising of the oppressed Christians against the Ottoman rule without visible participation of the Principality of Serbia was the dominant course of Serbia’s national policy until the early 1860s – until the formation of the militia.

Planned and organised preparations of an uprising began in March 1849 and lasted until 1851. Ilija Garašanin, as the Minister of Interior, and his closest associates Jovan Marinović, Matija Ban and Toma Kovačević drafted the Constitution of Political Propaganda to be Pursued in Slavic-Turkish Countries. The Constitution did not specify the role of the army or whether the Principality of Serbia would enter a potential war and, as historian Miloš Jagodić concludes, “the leaders of the organisation overestimated the possibility of a nationwide uprising and underestimated the need for Serbia’s more significant military engagement”.

The preparations and the war for Italian unification in 1858/59, the foreign policy of France which proclaimed the principle of the self-determination of people, and the alliance between Russia and France, stirred up the spirits in Serbia and the

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42 Р. Љушић, Књига о Начертанију, 155, 164; М. Јагодић, Србија и Стара Србија, 90–95.
43 In early 1844, in a speech at the National Assembly, President of the Greek Government Ioannis Kolettis promoted, in fact, the “Megali idea”. The Greek state had its “historical mission” in the East, aimed at the liberation of the Greek and Christian people from the Ottoman, infidel rule (Славенко Терзић, Србија и Грчка (1856–1903). Борба за Балкан, Београд 1992, 76–77).
44 The Principality of Serbia was helping churches and monasteries outside the Principality in money and books. According to in-depth research of Miloš Jagodić, 5,750 ducats and 18,300 groschen were given to churches and monasteries in Old Serbia, and 22,855 various textbooks and other books to schools, from 1851 to 1868 (М. Јагодић, Србија и Стара Србија, 138–142; 152). Serbia spread its cultural influence in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and Bulgaria.
45 М. Јагодић, Србија и Стара Србија, 125.
Balkans, reawakening the question of an uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{46} In a document of 1858, Garašanin explained the importance of instigating an uprising in those areas, but only with Serbia’s consent. If an uncontrolled uprising broke out, support was to be given to smaller companies, or frontiersmen from the Austrian border would be encouraged to join the rebels.\textsuperscript{47}

Matija Ban (1818–1903), a Catholic from Dubrovnik, who first served as a teacher of Prince Aleksandar’s daughters in the 1840s in the Principality, and was then a professor at the Lyceum and the Artillery School – was one of the most eminent “planners of national-liberation actions” of Serbia in the mid-19th century. In 1848, Ban issued in Belgrade two small books: “Osnovi rata” (“Basics of War”) and “Pravila o četničkoj vojni” (“Rules on Company Warfare”); a supplemented version of the first book was published in 1861.\textsuperscript{48} The second book, which Ban translated from Polish and adapted for local circumstances in the Balkans, was a manual for guerrilla warfare. Being close to the ruling circles in Belgrade, Ban developed his planning and organisational activities particularly in 1860–1861. At the time, the so-called Secret Board operated under his leadership in Belgrade, tasked with preparing an uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The fact that he was presenting his plans to Russian diplomats in Vienna, and to Austrians, from whom money was requested for an uprising against the Ottoman rule, eventually discredited Matija Ban in the eyes of both parties, including the Serbian government. By the decision of Prince Mihailo, Ban’s committee was abolished in spring 1861.\textsuperscript{49} In accordance with his convictions and the then military capacities of Serbia – the personal, lucrative interest should not be disregarded either – Matija Ban propagated the idea of an uprising of the Christians against the Ottoman rule. The plan of the uprising was enclosed along with the memoir that Ban delivered to Russian envoy in Vienna Viktor Balabin in September 1860, in which he advocated the creation of a confederation of the South Slavs, and then the confederation of all Slavs.\textsuperscript{50} It envisaged the liberation first of the territories on which Serbia claimed a historical right, their annexation to the Principality, and then the unification of the South Slavs. Serbia’s task concerned “an amount of

\textsuperscript{46} Г. Јакшић, В. Вучковић, \textit{op. cit.}, 36; Антоније Орешковић, \textit{Мало вице светлости, повод брошуре „Књаз Михаило и заједничка радња балканских народа}, Београд 1895, 21–23.

\textsuperscript{47} АС, ИГ, 1072; Ксения. В. Мельчакова, \textit{Босния и Герцеговина в общественно‐политической жизни России в 1856–1875}, Москва 2019, 288–301.

\textsuperscript{48} Основи рата. Саставио по начелима најискуснији војвода, Београд 1848, л. 2. рр. 28 (Друго допуњено издање 1861. године); Правила о четничкој војни. Протолмачио из пољског са неким променама, изметцима и додацима, Београд 1848, 24.


\textsuperscript{50} А. Раденић, \textit{Документација тајног национално‐револуционарног комитета у Београду 1860–1861, Годишњак града Београда XIV (1967) 61–80; Србија и ослободилачки покрети на Балкану, 157–161; А. Раденић, \textit{op. cit.}, 64.
gunpowder and freedom for the secret Committee to carry out and organise the uprising, naturally in the manner which will not visibly compromise it”. The operational plan for an armed struggle envisaged the instigation of the uprising through partisan warfare, which would grow into a broad liberation movement.51

The programme document “To the Bosniaks” of July 1860, probably created under the influence of Matija Ban, confirms that the plans on the liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not count on the military help of Serbia. The document considered the possibility of liberation, “through the uprising of the people or with the help of a foreign state”. If Serbia decided to apply military force, it had to ensure 25,000 soldiers in the standing army and at least the same number in the reserve, to consolidate, with a half of them, the positions on its borders, and to use the second half to “go to Bosnia”. “Serbia is entirely unprepared for these sacrifices and this cannot be requested from it at this moment”, the document concludes.52

The first plans timidly considering the participation of the Principality’s army in a potential war appeared in 1860/61. After going around the Principality, an unknown author considered the offensive operations of the Serbian army to be directed at the “western and southern neighbourly areas of Serbia” (Bosnia, Herzegovina, Old Serbia – note by R. P.). These areas were to be “seized” through an attack, while the eastern and north-eastern parts of the country would be solidified, to prevent an onslaught from behind, in order to keep under control the Ottoman fortifications on the Danube and the Tsarigrad Road. Serbia’s advantages in a potential war were vaguely presented: the surprise factor, military aptness and the use of minimal means of war.53

51 А. Раденић, op. cit., 66. In a letter to Cvetko Rajović, the Minister of Interior, of 1/13 December 1860, Matija Ban presented his view of the Christians’ uprising. He believed they could not hope for an armed assistance of Serbia or any other state, which is why they had to launch an uprising on their own, without compromising the Serbian government. It was necessary to secretly obtain from Russia the means to launch an uprising, respect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire in principle and declaratively, and justify the uprising with the “trampled old right” (В. Вучковић, Политичка акција Србије у јужнословенским покрајинама Хабзбуршке монархије 1859–1874, Београд 1974, 30).

52 АС, ПО, 24–179; АСАНУ, фонд Матије Бана, 17, к. 60, 17/3; К. В. Меличикова, op. cit., 303–304. As the only way to liberate Bosnia, the author states the organisation of a rebel unit of 5,000 men in the area of Slavonia, Croatia and Dalmatia, which could make an incursion on that side, and an another unit that could attack Bosnia from Stari Vlah, present-day south-western Serbia. For this endeavour, 25,000 ducats were needed. Serbia, “or any other state, with only several regular soldiers, experienced officers and the commander-in-chief should help them, assume leadership of our armed troops and lead them ahead” (АС, ПО, 24–179).

53 The plan defined the strategic points convenient for a defence or an attack – in the north: Ostružnica, Obrenovac, Ušće, Šabac, Mitrovica and Rača; along the Drina river: Bijukliča ada, Šepačka ada and Soko; in the Užice county: Mokra gora, Vasilina česma, Požega and Užice; along the Zapadna Morava river: Čačak, Karanovac (Kraljevo), Kruševac and Aleksinac; in the east of the Principality: Knjaževac, Zaječar, Negotin, Bregovo, Donji Milanovac; in the basin of the Velika Morava river: Požarevac, Ćuprija; and the strategic places in the centre of the country: Kragujevac and Gornji Milanovac (АС, ПО, 24–193).
When Ilija Garašanin was appointed President of the Government and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Principality in 1861, a consistent foreign policy was pursued, supported by Russia. At the start of Garašanin’s term in office, an uprising in the Balkans remained in the focus of his thoughts about the liberation of the Christian peoples from Ottoman rule. In the memoir he presented to Prince Mihailo in October 1861, Garašanin emphasised the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the expansion of the Principality’s borders as the main objective of Serbia’s foreign policy. This could be achieved with frequent riots in the neighbouring Turkish provinces or by launching “a general insurrection of all Christians”. Frequent riots without a significant support from the outside would weaken the combat spirit of the insurgents, and the rebel units would be turned into hajduk bands and would, ultimately, due to failure, diminish Serbia’s reputation. A general uprising of the Christians in the Balkans was not possible either as “the surrounding peoples do not have any means by which they could sustain themselves in a single uprising, even in a shortest time”. Due to its geographic position and nature of the terrain (“our areas are not Montenegrin areas”) and unprepared in military terms, Serbia could not directly get involved in an armed conflict.

In accordance with the proclaimed foreign policy of Prince Mihailo, a new institutional framework for national policy affairs was created. In 1862, the “Central Board” was set up, consisting of state advisor Lazar Arsenijević Batalaka, head of the Artillery School and colonel Franja Zah, and retired Assistant Minister of Interior Atanasije Nikolić. The administration of the army also underwent a change as the Main Military Administration was transformed into the Ministry of Military in 1862. The establishment of the militia in Serbia ensured a stronger focus on the Principality’s potential military engagement in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, in an alliance with other Balkan states and peoples. The negotiations to that end were encouraged by the official circles in Russia, as well as Slavophile committees, which exerted a strong influence on the Russian public opinion. In the 1860s, the plans of Russian official and unofficial circles projected Serbia as the centre of gathering of
the Balkan Christians.\textsuperscript{58} The year 1861 saw the first attempts to create a Balkan union, i.e. an agreement between Serbia and Greece.\textsuperscript{59}

The war between Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire (Serbia was not prepared to get militarily engaged in that conflict), and the Ottoman bombardment of Belgrade in 1862, triggered a crisis which could escalate into a broader conflict. In the memoir “The Possibility that Serbia be Incited and Involved in the Battle Before it Hoped”, Atanasije Nikolić, a member of the Central Board, believed it was necessary to speed up the preparations on the organisation of the militia in Serbia and, together with Greece, “generate uprising across Turkey”. Greece would act in Thessaly and Macedonia, and Serbia in Bulgaria and Bosnia.\textsuperscript{60} Nikolić also envisaged the army’s offensive operations towards Montenegro, along the same route Karađorđe took in 1809, which would be synchronised with the start of riots and uprisings in Bulgaria, Old Serbia and Bosnia. The little faith in the military strength of the Principality is seen in the following sentence: „Only if the Greek Eteria achieved the desired success could Serbia go into a conflict with the Turks, but with utmost precaution“.\textsuperscript{61} In the memoir “Commitment and Characteristic of State Policy” of April or May 1862, Nikolić espoused “a national war against Turkey” as the only way of achieving the objective. The following was necessary to instigate the war: 1) make an agreement with Greece and Montenegro, 2) help the liberation movements and 3) prepare Serbia for the war.\textsuperscript{62} Even more important is Nikolić’s in-depth memoir “The Presence and Future of the Balkan Peninsula”, which he wrote in summer 1862.\textsuperscript{63} He reiterated that a war against the Ottoman Empire had to have the character of a national war, with Serbia having the lead role. As Serbia was unable to organise a sufficiently strong regular army, “it must go with its national army into the war with the Turks”. That is why it was necessary to accelerate preparations on its organisation.\textsuperscript{64} The valley of the Velika


\textsuperscript{59} The draft military convention between Serbia and Greece of 1861 envisaged the enlargement of the Greek standing army to 30,000 people, equipping the fleet, arming the people and inciting uprisings in Thessaly, Epirus, Macedonia and Thrace. Serbia made a commitment to enlarge the regular army to 12,000 people, organise the militia “according to the broadest criterion”, and arm the people and support the uprisings in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria (\textit{Србија и ослободилачки покрети}, 181; 192–194; Г. Јакшић, В. Вучковић, \textit{op. cit.}, 474–477). In late 1861, the conclusion of the agreement was postponed.

\textsuperscript{60} В. Вучковић, \textit{Политичка акција Србије}, 82.

\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Ibidem}, 261–262. On 4 March 1862, Toma Kovačević drafted the “Project for Raising a Riot against the Turks in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Old Serbia, Niš and Vidin Pashaliks”, with a plan to establish a network of agents who would work on preparing the uprising (М. Јагодић, \textit{Искуства из Првог српског устанка}, 127).

\textsuperscript{62} \textit{Ibidem}, 261–262. On 4 March 1862, Toma Kovačević drafted the “Project for Raising a Riot against the Turks in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Old Serbia, Niš and Vidin Pashaliks”, with a plan to establish a network of agents who would work on preparing the uprising (М. Јагодић, \textit{Искуства из Првог српског устанка}, 127).


\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Србија и ослободилачки покрети}, 280. Nikolić estimated that in the European part, the Porte could count on the total of 167,000 regular soldiers and bashi-bazouks. They would be
Morava and Južna Morava rivers was envisaged as the main direction of military actions of the Serbian army. Given the geographic and topographic characteristics, the potential battlefield in the Serbian sector was divided into the left and right half relative to the Morava river. Niš was designated as the main point on the left half, while the concentration of the Serbian army on the right half of the imaginary front would be in Požega, Čačak, Karanovac (Kraljevo) and Kruševac. Nikolić believed that the Serbian army, however, was not on a par with the Ottoman army and was unprepared to directly oppose it in the Morava valley. He counted on the help of Bulgarian rebels, who would hamper the grouping of Ottoman troops in Rumelia, while the Serbian army would seize the Toplica valley and the Grdelica Gorge. At the same time, the rebels on the right bank of the Južna Morava would take Zaplanje and the Sićevo Gorge. Only then could the army from the Principality move along the Tsarigrad Road. West to the Principality, Nikolić planned offensive operations towards Bosnia, the seizure of Sarajevo, only after smaller units from Serbia incited an uprising in north-eastern and north-western Bosnia. What would ensue was an attack of the army from Serbia towards Sjenica, the seizure of Nova Varoš, Višegrad and Prijepolje, and establishing a connection with the Vasojevićs and Brđani, whereby the link of Bosnia with the rest of the Empire would be severed. This plan relied on military experiences of the Serbian rebel army from 1809, when Vožd Karađorđe took the same road to meet Montenegrin Bishop Petar I.65

On 25 January / 6 February 1863, Antonije Orešković, a former Austrian officer, wrote the “Proposal of the War Operational Plan of Serbia”, considering the possibilities for Serbia to wage a war against the Ottoman Empire on its own, in an alliance with Greece and Wallachia – he excluded Montenegro due to the dynastic conflicts – with the help of Christian uprisings.66 According to Orešković’s estimate, opposed with the forces of the Balkan states: Serbia with 100,000 national and regular soldiers, Greece with 88,000 and Montenegro with 12,000 soldiers – in total 200,000 soldiers, who would be aided by 8–10,000 Serbian, around 15,000 Bulgarian and up to 5,000 Greek rebels. In the planned war against the Ottomans, Nikolić observed the territory of the Balkan peninsula as a battlefield divided into six sectors: 1) Serbian, between the Drina river and the Adriatic sea and the Južna Morava basin; 2) northern Bulgarian, between the Danube river and the Balkans; 3) central Bulgarian, the Maritsa river basin; 4) southern Bulgarian, the basin of the Mesta, Struma and Vardar rivers; 5) Montenegrin-Herzegovian, the Neretva river basin and northern Albania (М. Јагодић, op. cit., 128–129).  

66 Србија и ослободилачки покрети, 287–318; М. Јагодић, op. cit., 131. Orešković overestimated the number of Serbian troops and reduced the size of the Ottoman army. In the event that Serbia went into a war on its own, it would place on the eastern and western border two corps with 25,000 soldiers each, and set up four commands: in Karanovac with 20,000 men, Kruševac with 30,000, Ražanj with 25,000 and Kragujevac, as a reserve, with 35,000 men. In other two variants, the Serbian army would operate offensively only after smaller units launched uprisings inside the territory of the Ottoman Empire. According to Orešković’s plan, Bosnia was to be liberated through an uprising of the Christians and Bosniaks, but it was “necessary to organise the due force outside Bosnia”, which would make incursions from different places (Србија и ослободилачки покрети, 313–315).
Serbia had 5,420 soldiers of the regular army, 50,500 first-class militia soldiers, 55,600 second-class soldiers – in total 106,200 soldiers, and 144 cannons. He estimated the Ottoman army had at its disposal 155,600 men and 300 cannons. Although relatively numerous, with a strong military spirit that the Serbian people were imbued with, Orešković believed, just like Nikolić, that Serbia’s militia, unlike the Swiss and Prussian militia, “gathered in larger bodies (...) would not be able to progress actively, but always passively”. In January 1865, Orešković drafted the proposal about the organisation of companies of soldiers in Bosnia and introduced these ideas into the proposed plan of March 1867. He believed Serbia had two ways: “To rise against Turkey with all its strength, or to first incite an uprising, in a clandestine way, in border Turkish provinces, and then, given the circumstances, to decide what to do”. It was most opportune for Serbia to encourage uprisings in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Old Serbia, as it would thus not be compromised in the eyes of European states, while by organising companies in its territory which would make incursions in Turkey, it would ensure the control of the uprising, for which it would, at first instance, bear a financial brunt. “In this way, Serbia would organise in the borderline area another army for itself, by doubling its offensive force, by foreign, rather than own burden.”

Captain Ljubomir Ivanović, the Serbian military attaché in Constantinople, in the “Project of an Uprising of Christians in European Turkey” of August 1866, analysed, just like Atanasije Nikolić, on whose plan he relied, a joint war of Serbia, Greece and Montenegro, in synergy with the uprisings of the Serbs in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Old Serbia, and the uprisings of the Bulgarians, Greeks, as well as Albanians, which was a novelty compared to other war plans. The uprisings in the depth of the Ottoman territory were to stretch the Ottoman army in the width. The army from Serbia would consolidate itself at eight strategic border points from the Drina river in the west to the Timok in the east. The units grouped in Požega, Karanovac (Kraljevo), Kruševac and Kneževac were to carry out offensive operations. The units from Požega would go towards Sjenica, to meet the Montenegrin army, and one part would go towards Višegrad and Bosnia. The units from Karanovac (present-day Kraljevo – note by R. P.) would go towards Novi Pazar, from Kruševac towards Toplica. The Prince’s army was to make a demonstration towards Niš and the real objective was the seizure of Pirot.

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67 Ibidem, 298–299; А. Орешковић, Мало више светлости, 8–9.
68 В. Вучковић, Политичка акција Србије, 261.
69 Ibidem, 263. Orešković developed in detail the organisation of ad hoc companies of soldiers. Each company would have between 120 and 150 soldiers, four officers and 14 sub-officers and one trumpeter. Companies would be set up along the Drina river in the east and the Sava in the north, in Montenegro and Dalmatia. In addition to companies, 11 boards would be set up to manage and coordinate operations, until circumstances allowed – with the development of the uprising in Bosnia – for the creation of the central board or the government. Orešković’s plan contained fantastic elements. It envisaged the setting up of a voluntary unit of day labourers from Lika and Dalmatia who lived in the environs of Ancona in Italy, and other units in Corfu which would take part in the uprising (В. Вучковић, Политичка акција Србије, 272).
After it consolidated in Pirot and cut the connection on the Tsarigrad Road, the army would start to besiege and capture Niš. Thus, just like Atanasije Nikolić’s plan, Ivanović’s plan envisaged a joint action of the rebels and the Serbian army, a breakthrough towards south-west, in order to cut the connection of the Bosnian Pashalik with other parts of the Empire, and a breakthrough towards south-east and south, and the capture of the Južna Morava basin, with the ultimate objective of taking Niš.70

It was clear to the statesmen in Serbia, officers and authors of the above plans that the Principality of Serbia, just like any other Balkan state, was not prepared to independently engage in a war against the Ottoman Empire. At the ministerial counselling in August 1866, Garašanin requested from Minister of the Army Milivoje Petrović Blaznavac a report on Serbia’s combat readiness, and received the answer that the army was still unprepared for a war. A decision was made to increase the military budget by three million groschen.71 With the support of Russia, the work on creating an alliance of Balkan states was accelerated. The First Balkan Alliance was created with the agreements concluded between Serbia and Montenegro in 1866, Serbia and Greece in 1867, and Serbia and Romania in 1868. The joint objective stipulated by the agreement with Montenegro was the liberation from the Ottoman rule and unification of the Serbian people. It was agreed that both states should work on preparing an uprising against the Ottoman rule. Serbia was given the leading role in future operations and the adoption of a joint war plan was envisaged.72 The agreement with Greece foresaw a joint start of war operations, with Serbia being obliged to have 60,000 soldiers, and Greece 30,000 soldiers and a fleet.73 The agreement with Romania, signed in February 1868, placed an emphasis on the development of trade relations between the two states.74 The question is whether the alliance between the three vassal and one internationally recognised Balkan state

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70 М. Јагодић, Искуства из Првог српског устанка, 133–134; Душан Берић, „Пројект” Љубомира Ивановића из 1866. године о устанку хришћана у европској Турској, Зборник МС за историју 27 (1983) 151–171.
71 Записници седница Министарског савета Србије 1862–1898, приредио Н. Шкеровић, Београд 1952, 37–38; Д. Страњаковић, op. cit., 348. Prussia’s victory in the war against Austria made Blaznavac introduce novelties into the Serbian army. The new formation of the national army was created. The first class consisted of 16.5 brigades, i.e. six divisions. Each brigade had its own headquarters, a battery of cannons, the cavalry, pioneer company, impedimenta and medical corps, and was thus equipped for autonomous operations. The first class had 60,000 soldiers. The second class followed the same system, but had a smaller number of soldiers (Г. Јакшић, В. Вучковић, op. cit., 278–279). In summer 1866, 27,000 “М 1854” rifles were bought in Hamburg (Д. Леовац, op. cit., 230).
72 В. Вучковић, Г Јакшић, op. cit., 281–286.
73 Ibidem, 315–330; 510–515. The possibility of separate withdrawal of one party from the war was agreed, but only after Bosnia and Herzegovina were ceded to Serbia, and Epirus and Thessaly to Greece. The contracting parties were obliged to work on winning over the Christians and Albanians for the uprising (Д. Леовац, op. cit., 184).
74 Г. Јакшић, В. Вучковић, op. cit., 486–489; 510–520.
was capable of militarily opposing the Ottoman army. Historian Danko Leovac
compared the mutual relation of the military forces of members of the Balkan Alliance
and their total force with the Ottoman army in 1867/68.75 Serbia’s share in total
military force of the Alliance was 51% (Romania: 22%, Greece: 19% and Montenegro:
8%), and in artillery weapons 74% (Romania: 14%, Greece: 10% and Montenegro:
2%), while the total ratio of the military force of the Ottoman Empire to members of
the Balkan Alliance was 67% vs. 33%.76 It is clear that the joint armies of the Balkan
states were no equal to the Ottoman forces.77

Russian military attaché in Constantinople Franchini, in his military plan “General
Considerations of the Operations of the Serbian Army against the Turkish Force”,
which he prepared in January 1867 upon the order of Russian Minister of War
Milyutin, explicitly stated that Serbia, with its 1.1 million inhabitants and a budget of
11.5 million francs, “should not even think about launching operations on its own”.
Still, he also noted that the country should not remain in a defensive, but had to
undertake an action outside its borders. “In an open war” with the Porte, Serbia
would fare as bad as Greece in 1854. His proposed war plan thus contained both the
defensive and offensive perspective. He estimated the Serbian military forces at
85,000.78 Serbia’s first task was to expel Ottoman garrisons from its towns –
something not mentioned in previous plans – which would initiate a broader conflict.
“By entering a [war – note by R. P.] wheel for the first time after 40 years, Serbia
cannot do anything else but to 1) instigate local rebellions in Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina; 2) stretch its hand to the rebels by showing its flag in different places;
3) deploy its army towards Turkey so that it can receive and repel each attack; 4)
sever the link between Bosnia and Rumelia”.79 Franchini – only in case rebellions were
sparked off across the Empire – designated the valley of the Morava river towards

75 According to the results of his research, in 1867/68 Montenegro had at its disposal not more
than 12,500 soldiers, around 13,000 rifles, 12 swivel guns. Although pursuant to the
agreement, Greece was to prepare 30,000 soldiers, judging by the report of a Serbian military
agent from late 1866, it had merely 8,000 soldiers, a fleet of six smaller ships and around
18,000 rifles. Romania could count on 33,338 soldiers, of whom 7,600 members of the
regular army, 5,611 gendarmes and 20,127 members of border units (Д. Леовац, op. cit.,
212–213; 216–217).

76 Ibidem, 218–221.

77 The Nizam, the active Ottoman army, trained and established upon the experiences and
practice of European armies, had 130,000 men (of whom 60,000 in the European part),
the Etayos – the first reserve of 20,000–100,000 men, and the Redif (the second reserve) –
230,000 soldiers in total. In addition to the regular army, there were internal security units
or the “civic army” (the police, gendarmerie, Seimeni and gavazi), bashi-bazouks of up to
60,000 (volunteers and the militia), auxiliary troops from Egypt (15,000) and Tunisia
(30,000). It was estimated that in the early 1860s the Porte had at its disposal 320,000
soldiers (Ж. Ђорђевић, op. cit., 61).

78 The standing army – 4,000, first-class militia – 50,000, second-class militia – 25,000,
volunteers – 6,000.

79 АС, ИГ, 1621.
Niš as the main direction of the breakthrough of the Serbian army. The second front would be directed towards Sjenica, Novi Pazar and Kolašin, while the secondary front would be established between Negotin and Zaječar.\textsuperscript{80}

The withdrawal of the Ottoman army from the fortifications in Serbia in spring 1867, the new organisation of the Habsburg Monarchy and a number of other factors made Prince Mihailo temporarily give up on launching a war against the Ottoman Empire. One of important reasons was the fact that the militia of the Principality of Serbia, despite years-long preparations and significant steps forward in organisation, was not prepared for a war against the Ottoman Empire. This was proven by the events that ensued.

Namely, the uprising in Herzegovina and Bosnia in 1875 precipitated the Great Eastern Crisis. Serbia and Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire in 1876, but the Serbian national army was defeated in the First Serbian-Turkish War (1876/77). This war woefully revealed numerous shortcomings in the organisation and armament of the Serbian army. The recognition of Serbia’s state independence at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 was merely the first precondition for the creation of a stable military organisation. The Law on the Organisation of the Army of 1883 laid down a modern military organisation – active and reserve army; it introduced a new formation: divisions instead of corps, re-organised the General Staff etc. The process of armament and education of the officer and sub-officer cadre began. It took almost half a century – from the 1860s, for Serbia to get prepared for military operations and achieve its goal, set a long time ago, in an alliance with other Balkan states in the First Balkan War of 1912/13.

\textsuperscript{80} М. Јагодић, \textit{Искуства из Првог српског устанка}, 134–135.
L’ESERCITO DEL PRINCIPATO DI SERBIA NEI PIANI DI LIBERAZIONE E UNIFICAZIONE NAZIONALE A METÀ DEL XIX SECOLO

Riassunto

Dal 1833 al 1878, il Principato di Serbia occupava 37.740 km². A metà del XIX secolo aveva circa 1,1 milioni di abitanti. Era un tipico paese agrario in cui, dopo la rottura con i resti del feudalesimo ottomano, si stabilirono dei rapporti capitalistici. Essendo in una posizione di stato vassallo nei confronti dell’Impero Ottomano, ma anche a causa degli alti costi di mantenimento dell’esercito, dalla metà del XIX secolo all’inizio degli anni Ottanta del XIX secolo, le truppe stazionarie e l’esercito popolare (milizia) coesistevano fianco a fianco. “L’esercito di guarnigione”, cioè le truppe stazionarie di 2-3 mila soldati, furono la principale forza militare dal 1839 al 1859. Il comando supremo sull’esercito della guarnigione apparteneva formalmente al sovrano, ma, in sostanza, era sotto l’autorità del Ministro degli Interni. La Legge del 1861 istituì “l’esercito popolare”, vuol dire che fu introdotto il servizio militare per gli uomini dai 20 ai 50 anni. Il comando supremo appartenneva al principe sovrano, al quale era direttamente responsabile il Ministro dell’esercito. Si stima che l’Esercito popolare, insieme alle truppe stazionarie che contavano alcune migliaia di soldati, avesse tra 80.000 e 100.000 soldati. La mancanza di ufficiali e di armi moderne erano i principali problemi che all’epoca gravavano sul funzionamento dell’esercito serbo, anche se nel 1848 fu fondata una manifattura destinata alla fusione dei cannoni, che nel 1853 si trasformò in una fabbrica (Fonderia dei cannoni), e nel 1850 fu anche istituita una Scuola di artiglieria per la formazione degli ufficiali. Nei piani di liberazione nazionale degli anni Quaranta e Cinquanta il posto dominante ce l’avevano i riferimenti al diritto storico, ovvero la rottura con l’eredità ottomana esistente e il rinnovamento dello Stato entro i confini medievali, un fenomeno che caratterizzava tutti i popoli balcanici. Le idee dello storicismo trovarono il loro posto nell’Elaborato di Ilija Garašanin del 1844. Lui in qualità di Ministro degli Interni (1843-1852) e di Primo Ministro (1852/53 e 1861-1867), consapevole del potenziale militare della Serbia, aveva intenzione di liberare e unire il popolo serbo e gli altri popoli slavi del sud organizzando una rete di commissari e preparando una rivolta contro il potere ottomano. L’instaurazione dell’Esercito popolare in Serbia diede sempre di più impulso all’idea di includere, nei piani di rovesciamento dell’Impero Ottomano, la possibilità di un impiego militare della Serbia in alleanza con altri stati e popoli balcanici. Nei piani di Atanasij Nikolić, Matija Ban, Antonije Orešković, Ljubomir Ivanović e l’invio militare russo a Costantinopoli Franchini degli anni ’60, l’Esercito popolare del Principato avrebbe avuto un ruolo prevalentemente difensivo in una possibile guerra contro gli ottomani. Solo nel caso dell’inizio di una rivolta massiccia dei cristiani, avrebbe avuto un ruolo di attacco. Con i trattati di alleanza con il
Montenegro (1866), la Grecia (1867) e la Romania (1868), il principe Mihailo intendeva iniziare una guerra contro l’Impero Ottomano in circostanze internazionali favorevoli. Tuttavia, la Serbia, in quanto paese militarmente più forte dell’alleanza, nonostante la nuova organizzazione militare, non era pronta a entrare in guerra, e nemmeno lo erano gli altri paesi balcanici. Ci volle quasi un altro mezzo secolo prima che la Serbia fosse pronta e, che in alleanza con gli stati balcanici, espellesse gli ottomani nella Prima guerra balcanica nel 1912/13.

**Parole chiave:** Principato di Serbia, Esercito popolare, Elaborato, piani, Ilija Garašanin, Principe Mihailo, Matija Ban, Atanasije Nikolić
Војска Кнежевине Србије у плановима о националном ослобођењу и уједињењу средином 19. века

Резиме

Кнежевина Србија од 1833. до 1878. године простирала се на 37.740 km². У њој је средином 19. века живело око 1,1 милиона становника. Била је типична аграрна земља у којој су после раскида са остацима османског феудализма успостављани капиталистички односи. Будући у вазалном државном положају према Османском царству, али и због великих трошкова одржавања војске, у Кнежевини су од средине 19. века до почетка осамдесетих година 19. века, напоредо постојале стајаће трупе и народна војска (милиција). „Гарнизоно војинство“, односно стајаће трупе од 2-3 хиљаде војника чинило су главну војну снагу од 1839. до 1859. године. Врховна команда над гарнизоном војском формално је припадала владару, али је, суштински, била у надлежности министра унутрашњих дела. Законом 1861. године установљена је „народна војска“, то јест, уведен је војна обавеза за мушкарце од 20 до 50 године живота. Врховна команда припала је владару-кнезу којем је непосредно био одговоран министар војске. Процењује се да је народна војска заједно са стајаћим трупама имала између 80.000 до 100.000 војника. Недостатак официрског кадра и савременог наоружања су главни проблеми који су оптерећивали функционисање војске у Србији у то време, иако је 1848. основана мануфактура за изливање топова, која је 1853. прерасла у фабрику (Тополивницу), а 1850. године основана Артиљеријска школа за обучавање официра. У плановима за национално ослобођење из четрдесетих и педесетих година 19. века доминантно место је зазимало позивање на историјско право, односно, раскид са постојећим османским наслеђем и обнова државе у средњевековним границама, што је карактеристична појава код свих балканских народа. Идеје историцизма нашле су своје место у Начертанију Илије Гарашанина из 1844. Он је као министар унутрашњих дела (1843-1852) и председник владе (1852/53 и 1861-1867) свестан војних потенцијала Србије ослобођење је уједињење српског народа и јужнословенских народа намеравао да спроведе организоване мреже повереника и припремање устанка против османске власти. Установљење народне војске у Србији дало је замах да се у плановима о рушењу Османског царства све више разматрала могућност војног ангажовања Србије и то у савезу са осталим балканским државама и народима. У плановима Атанасија Николића, Матије Бана, Антонија Орешковића, Љубомира Ивановића и руског војног изасланика у Цариграду Франкинија из шездесетих година 19. века, народна војска Кнежевине би у евентуалном рату против Османлија имала претежно дефансивну улогу. Тек у случају покretaња
масовног устанака хришћана намењена су јој офанзивна дејства. Кнез Михаило је уговорима о савезу са Црном Гором (1866), Грчком (1867) и Румунијом (1868) намеравао да у повољним међународним околностима покрене рат против Османског царства. Међутим, Србија као војно најснажнија земља савеза, упркос новој војној организацији није била спремна да се упусти у рат, као што то нису биле и остале балканске земље. Било је потребно да прође готово још пола века да се Србија спреми и да у савезу са балканским државама протера Османлије у првом Балканском рату 1912/13. године.

Кључне речи: Кнежевина Србија, народна војска, Начертаније, планови, Илија Гарашанин, кнез Михаило, Матија Бан, Атанасије Николић