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Biljana VUČETIĆ

AN OVERVIEW OF SERBIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY ON SERBIAN-ITALIAN RELATIONS*

Abstract: This paper aims to give an overview of Serbian historiography on Serbian-Italian relations from the first contacts between Serbia and Italy in the 19th century until Serbia's entry into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. It thus also represents a short outline of Serbian-Italian relations in that period. Although there is no comprehensive monograph on Serbian-Italian relations, numerous papers of historians Ljiljana Aleksić Pejčević, Dragoljub Živojinović and Andrej Mitrović create the picture of political, diplomatic and cultural links between the two states.

Key words: Serbia, Italy, historiography, Serbian-Italian relations.

Relations between Serbia and Italy in modern times have not been a frequent subject of Serbian historiography. In contrast, relations of the Serbian medieval state with Italian states, the Republic of Venice and the Kingdom of Naples, have been thoroughly studied by Serbian medievalists.¹

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¹ Only several selected papers are listed below: Ружа Ђук, *Србија и Венеција у XIII и XIV веку*, Београд 1986; Ibid, *La Serbia e Venezia nella prima metà del XV secolo: personaggi e commerci*, Glas – Académie serbe des sciences et des arts CDIV, Classe des sciences historiques 13 (2006) 137–148; Sima Ćirković, *I Serbi nel Medioevo*, Milano 1992; Ibid, *Importazione di tecnologie dall'Italia ed esportazione di maestranze dalla Serbia*, Glas – Académie serbe des sciences et des arts CDIV, Classe des sciences historiques 13 (2006) 73–83; Momčilo Spremić, *Dubrovnik e gli Aragonesi (1442–1495)*, Palermo, Accademia nazionale di scienze lettere e arti, 1986; Ibid, *Il despota Giorgio Branković e Venezia*, Glas – Académie serbe des sciences et des arts CDIV, Classe des sciences historiques 13 (2006) 119–135; Ibid, *Србија и Венеција (VI–XVI век)*, Београд 2013.

This paper represents an overview of Serbian historiography on relations between Serbia and Italy in the 19th and 20th centuries, from the first serious contacts to the founding of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. This overview also represents an outline of Serbian-Italian relations in the specified timeframe.

A comprehensive overview of Serbian-Italian relations has not been presented in any separate monograph. Liaisons and relations between the two countries have been covered mainly by studies on international relations and papers on specific issues. The first and only complete monograph dealing with Italy's policy towards Serbia in the 19th century is *Политика Италије према Србији до 1870. године* ("Italy's Policy Towards Serbia until 1870") by historian Ljiljana Aleksić Pejčković.²

Serbian historiography has focused on several topics regarding relations with Italy.

The first topic concerns similarities and differences between **the Serbian national movement and the Risorgimento**. Serbia found its place in Italy's foreign policy back at the time of the 1848/1849 revolution, as a potential ally against the common enemy Austria. The aim of Italy's foreign policy was to create a chance for a diplomatic solution to Italy's unification through the movement among the Balkan peoples. After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 and in light of Austria-Hungary's aspiration to penetrate the Balkans, the Italian government showed the intention to support the creation of an independent South Slavic state headed by Serbia and its Prince Mihailo, which would be an obstacle both to Germanism and Pan-Slavism.

On the other hand, Serbia tried to use the predecessor state of today's Italy – the Kingdom of Sardinia, as an ally in its struggle for independence and national unification. Sardinia entered the Concert of Europe after the Crimean War, in 1856, as a protectress of Turkey's integrity. The Serbian government aimed to arouse France's interest in circumstances in the Balkans also through Italy. According to the Principality of Serbia's foreign policy, Italy was, among the Great Powers, one more ally inclined towards Serbia. Italy's liberation and unification served to Serbia as a lesson and guidepost for action.³

The main features of the Italian movement – the struggle against Austria, creation of a constitutional parliamentary monarchy and Mazzini's activity, became an example for the United Serbian Youth in terms of the national struggle and political life and as a synonym for everything progressive and democratic. Mazzini's faction advocated Italy's unification through the struggle against Austria, adherence to the nationality principle and cooperation with South Slavs. The other Italian faction, headed by Count Cesare Balbo espoused a diplomatic solution to the Italian question, recognising the existing balance of powers in Europe, i.e. through a compromise with Austria.

Substantial contribution to this subject was given by Nikša Stipčević, a literary historian and professor of Italian studies. He believed that the Italian interest in Serbs and Serbia in the mid-19th century was not a consequence of the government policy in Italy, but that it fitted into the concept of the Risorgimento. Giuseppe Mazzini

² Љ. Алексић Пејковић, *Политика Италије према Србији до 1870. године*, Београд 1979.

³ Ibid, 345.

and Niccolò Tommaseo were the forerunners of cultural and political curiosity towards the Slavs.⁴ Up until the late 1860s, Italy and Serbia pursued anti-Austrian policy, which made them closer to one another. However, when Italy moved closer to Austria-Hungary, its attention turned to Montenegro.

Exploring the activity of Giuseppe Mazzini and Vladimir Jovanović, Stipčević concluded that their similarities were only political and by no means ideological.⁵ Mazzini advocated “managed” democracy, where the intelligentsia would mediate between “God and people”. Vladimir Jovanović was probably not even familiar with Mazzini’s writings. Mazzini’s religious ideology was contrary to the positivistic ideology of Vladimir Jovanović whose spiritual father was John Stuart Mill. Jovanović’s merit lies in the creation of the first modern political movement – the United Serbian Youth, in 1866, following in the Mazzini’s footsteps who founded in Italy the first modern Republican Party. Serbian liberals, headed by Vladimir Jovanović, embraced Mazzini’s ideas, and the United Serbian Youth was established upon the model of the Young Italy. On the other hand, Cesare Balbo believed that Italy’s interest lay in the creation of an Austro-Slavic empire that would drive Austria to another direction.

One of the main consequences of the Italian example of the Risorgimento was strengthening of the myth about Serbia as the Piedmont of South Slavs, the myth that would contribute to the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, through the publication of the Serbian newspaper *Пужмонт (Piedmont)* from 1911 to 1915.

Another topic of Serbian historiography on Serbian-Italian relations is **Italy’s attitude towards Serbia in regard to the Eastern Question**. The main contribution in this field has been given by Ljiljana Aleksić Pejković.

From 1848/49 to 1866, Italy’s policy was benevolent towards Serbia. In her treaties titled *Уједињење Италије и национални програм Кнежевине Србије* (“Italy’s Unification and National Programme of the Principality of Serbia”) and *Међусобни утицај италијанског и српског националног покрета (до 1878)* (“Mutual Influences of Italian and Serbian National Movements Until 1878”), Ljiljana Aleksić argues that Mazzini himself was also familiar with the Serbian political programme – *Načertanije*. Italy supported Serbia’s aspiration to internal autonomy, but opposed a radical solution to the Eastern Question. In 1861–1862, Italian volunteers were ready to join the rebels from Herzegovina. After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, Italy in principle decided to support the Serbian-South Slavic state, with Serbia as its Piedmont and Prince Mihailo its ruler.⁶

⁴ Н. Стипчевић, *Србија и Италија у XIX веку*, Глас Српске академије наука и уметности ССCLXXVII, Одељење језика и књижевности 16 (1995) 27.

⁵ Н. Стипчевић, *Ђузепе Маџини и Владимир Јовановић*, Прилози за КИФ XXXVIII, 3–4 (1972) 163–201.

⁶ Љ. Алексић Пејковић, *Међусобни утицај италијанског и српског националног покрета (до 1878)*, in: Идејна и политичка кретања код југословенских народа, Чеха и Словака у другој половини XIX века, Зборник радова, Београд 1987, 109–121; Љ. Алексић Пејковић, *Уједињење Италије и национални програм Кнежевине Србије*, in: Споменица др Данице Милић, Београд 2013.

Analysing Serbia's policy towards Italy's unification in the Belgrade and Vojvodina press of 1865–1866, Ljiljana Aleksić Pejковић concludes that the victory of the nationality principle in Italy provoked enthusiasm among the Serbian public and gave rise to the hope that the same would happen in the Balkans provided the Balkan peoples came to an agreement. Nonetheless, the Serbian public did not show unity in terms of the manner of making an agreement and as to the tactics of solving the Eastern Question. Official circles in Serbia upheld a cautious and partial solution, along with reliance on European diplomacy. Others favoured an agreement and joint action of all Balkan peoples. The first option prevailed, succeeding in the banishment of the Turks from Serbian towns, with the support of European diplomacy.⁷

In regard to the Eastern Crisis (1876–1878), together with its allies from the Triple Alliance, the Italian government put pressure on Serbia and Montenegro not to send arms to rebels in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In her paper *Италија и српско-турски ратови 1876–1878* ("Italy and Serbo-Turkish Wars 1876–1878"), Lj. Aleksić Pejковић shows that Italy supported not a single request of Serbia at the Congress of Berlin, apart from the request for independence, whereas Visconti Venosta, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, believed that the Eastern Question had been opened too early as it would be best for Italy if it remained unopened for another ten years.⁸ In the Eastern Crisis, Italy adhered to Balbo's policy – Austria-Hungary's expansion to the East meant concessions for Italy in the West.

Italy's position during the Serbo-Bulgarian War (1885) was exceptionally complex as Italy was under the Austro-Hungarian influence. Italian politicians held the position that any change in the balance in the Balkans in favour of Austria-Hungary entailed compensation. After the period of strong sympathies, relations between Serbia and Italy were marginalised in both countries. Serbia was under full economic dependence of Austria-Hungary (1881) and the Serbian market was distanced from Italy which fostered its Mediterranean policy, which is why mutual relations died away. Italy aimed to preserve the situation in European politics after the Congress of Berlin. Italian diplomacy was not surprised with Serbia's reaction to Bulgaria's unification with Rumelia, and it assessed Serbia after the Timok Rebellion as a weak and uneducated country.

In the spirit of the Risorgimento, the Italian public opinion sided with Bulgaria. Ljiljana Aleksić Pejковић explains such policy by Italy's fear of being drawn into something that would bolster the position of Austria-Hungary or Russia in the Balkans, i.e. something that would breach the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin.⁹ Italian diplomacy manoeuvred between its opponents in the Balkans – Austria-Hungary and Russia, with Russia considered a greater danger. The German Chancellor,

⁷ Љ. Алексић Пејковић, *Српска штампа и ратови за ослобођење и уједињење Италије 1859–1866. године*, Историјски часопис XX (1973) 251–306.

⁸ Љ. Алексић Пејковић, *Италија и српско-турски ратови 1876–1878*, Историјски часопис XXXII (1985) 153–186.

⁹ Љ. Алексић Пејковић, *Италија и српско-бугарска криза 1885–1886. године*, Историјски часопис XLII–XLIII (1995–1996) 124–145.

Otto von Bismarck had inclination towards Italy, which strengthened its positions within the Triple Alliance. Moreover, Article 8 of the Reinsurance Treaty of 1887 recognised to Italy its special interests in the Balkans, i.e. its right to compensation in the event of Austria's advancement in the Balkans.¹⁰

The period of the 1890s has not been covered separately in terms of Serbian-Italian relations. Analysing the episode of the Diplomatic Strike in 1903–1906, Lj. Aleksić Pejковић proves that Serbian diplomacy, headed by its envoy in Rome Milovan Milovanović, strove to involve Italian diplomacy in mediations with England. Italian diplomacy availed of the crisis to vacillate between the two blocs. Furthermore, with its engagement it partly contributed to Serbia's siding with the Entente.¹¹ An attempt at penetration of Italian capital in the Balkans took place also through the construction of railways in 1908. Namely, Italy participated in the Adriatic railways project and thus drove close to France.¹²

According to Lj. Aleksić Pejковић's research, Italy's foreign policy towards Serbia until World War I underwent three stages. The first was the "Eastern" stage, implying the process of national liberation and unification from 1848 to 1870, and commitment to the *status quo* in the Eastern Question. The second was the Mediterranean-colonial stage, marked by entry into the Triple Alliance in 1882, and adoption of the albanophile policy as a counterbalance to Austria's pressure. The last stage until 1914 was Eastern-Tripolitan, resulting in the collapse of colonial policy in Africa and shifting the focus back to the Adriatic.¹³

The third group of questions regarding Serbian-Italian relations that has been covered by Serbian historiography includes **Italy's policy towards Serbia in World War I**, its attitude towards the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the Adriatic Question.

Ljiljana Aleksić Pejковић underscores that in the first three war months of 1914, the Italian government avoided negotiations with Serbia, under the pretext of its neutral position and Serbia's status as a warring party. It was only San Giuliano (Antonio, Marquis di San Giuliano), Italy's Minister of Foreign Affairs, who considered absurd Italy's aspiration not to allow to the Balkan states an exit to the sea, and its pretensions to Slavic countries.¹⁴ During World War I, the Italian press assessed war events relating to Serbia from the viewpoint of Italy's own interests in the balance on the Adriatic, including the balance of power among the warring parties in terms of their significance.¹⁵ The

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Љ. Алексић Пејковић, *Допринос Италије обнављању српско-енглеских односа (1903–1906)*, Историјски часопис XVIII (1971) 429–449.

¹² Љ. Алексић Пејковић, *Италија и Јадранска железница*, Историјски часопис XXXIV (1987) 255–270.

¹³ Љ. Алексић Пејковић, *Српско питање у стратешким опредељењима балканске политике Италије у 19. веку*, Глас САНУ CDXX, Одељење историјских наука 16 (2012) 295–318.

¹⁴ Љ. Алексић Пејковић, *Ратни напори Србије у 1914. години и политика Француске и Италије*, in: Научни скуп Колубарска битка: ратни напори Србије 1914 године, Београд 1985, 169–186.

¹⁵ Љ. Алексић Пејковић, *Италијанска штампа о Србији и Црној Гори и југословенском питању*, in: Научни скуп Србија 1916 године, Београд 1987, 251–259.

Bissolati–Sonnino group¹⁶ upheld the Mazzini programme: destruction of Austria, creation of Yugoslavia and anti-German policy. The Orlando–Boselli¹⁷ group supported Germany's *Drang nach Osten*, occupation of Dalmatia, pushing Serbia to the inner parts of the Balkans, and was explicitly against the unification of Serbia and Montenegro.

Professor Dragoljub Živojinović has dealt the most with Serbian–Italian relations during World War I. As he concludes, at the beginning of the war, Minister San Giuliano pursued cautious policy, advocating Italy's greater presence in the Balkans through trade, banking, education and the construction of railways. His successor Baron Sidney Sonnino was in favour of new territories and domination on the Adriatic. The Treaty of London (April 1915) brought about a conflict between Italy and Serbia over the Yugoslav policy of the Serbian government and Sonnino's pretensions to Albania, Montenegro and Dalmatia. Strong resistance of the Italian government to the unification of Montenegro and Serbia brought about the occupation of the Bay of Kotor, Budva, Bar, Virpazar and Ulcinj. The unification remained unrecognised until the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo (November 1920).¹⁸ Živojinović argues that Italy's war objectives were of limited and local character. The Corfu Declaration (20 July 1917) formulated Serbia's war objectives, i.e. objectives of Yugoslav unification, which met with the lack of understanding by the great powers and provoked Italy's open enmity, as such objectives directly contravened its own interests. The conflict concerned Albania, Montenegro and Dalmatia.¹⁹

Dragoljub Živojinović's monograph, in Serbian and American edition, contributed to the revision of attitudes about the role of US President Woodrow Wilson in solving of the Adriatic Question (Dragoljub Živojinović, *Amerika, Italija i postanak Jugoslavije 1917–1919*, Beograd 1970; Dragan R. Živojinović, *America, Italy and the Birth of Yugoslavia (1917–1919)*, New York 1972). In numerous talks held with President Wilson, Italian representatives did not give up on provisions of the Treaty of London although Wilson was prepared to grant great concessions to Italy and ensure economic possibilities for its penetration into the Balkans (border at Brenner and in Istria). Professor Živojinović appeals for caution in attempts to emphasise Wilson's pro-Yugoslav orientation. Wilson's primary goal was to preclude a new war if the expansion included areas not essentially belonging to the Italian territory, i.e. areas not allocated under the nationality principle.²⁰

¹⁶ Ex-Socialist Leonida Bissolati advocated Italy's turning to the Triple Entente, and Sidney Sonnino, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs during the WWI, signed the secret Treaty of London in 1915.

¹⁷ Paolo Boselli was the Italian Prime Minister from June 1916 till October 1917, and Vittorio Emanuele Orlando was his successor in office till June 1919.

¹⁸ Д. Живојиновић, *Сан Ђулијано и италијанске претензије на Јадрану на почетку Првог светског рата 1914–1918*, Историјски часопис XX (1973) 307–317.

¹⁹ D. Živojinović, *Ratni ciljevi Srbije i Italija (1917)*, Istorija XX veka 1 (1983) 9–23.

²⁰ Д. Живојиновић, *Јадранско питање у периоду између потписивања примирја са Аустро-Угарском и почетка Париске мировне конференције 1919. године*, Зборник Филозофског факултета 10 (Београд 1968) 431–456.

Dragoljub Živojinović has also dealt with American-Italian relations from April 1917 to April 1919, which is a real novelty in research since historians have generally dealt with exploration and explanation of the nature of the Italian-Serbian or Yugoslav dispute on the Adriatic.²¹ Italian politicians believed that territories promised by the Treaty of London (Dalmatia, Tyrol, Istria, Rijeka) would bring predominance on the Adriatic. Živojinović explains the insistence on Italy's maximum territorial programme, which also implied the implementation of the Treaty of London and annexation of Rijeka upon the conclusion of the war, instead of accepting the Wilson's plan, by utter confusion among the Italian lines. Save for respecting the nationality principle, the discord between Italy and the US was also shown in maritime operations on the Adriatic, when the Italian admiralty refused proposals of American maritime forces. The final split-up between Italy and the US took place in April 1919, when talks were launched in Paris about Italian territorial pretensions. Wilson was a conservative Presbyterian with strong moral principles and found it extremely hard to acquiesce to the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. A decisive role in formulating the American policy at the Peace Conference and the attitude towards Italy was played by American maritime officers (Admiral William S. Benson), who provided information on the situation in the field, abuse of power in the Italian zone and their interference in the American and French zone. Only when all negotiation possibilities were exhausted did President Wilson resort to financial pressure on the Italian government.²²

Dragoljub Živojinović has recently collected and published his selected treatises and studies on Italy's policy in the Balkans, titled *У потрази за империјом: Италија и Балкан почетком XX века* ("Searching for an Empire: Italy and the Balkans in the Early 20th Century").²³ His research has also included Italy's policy towards Montenegro and Dalmatia, as the strategic points of Italian influence in the Balkans. Italy aimed to ensure positions that would guarantee its full security in the region of the Adriatic Sea and the Alps, where it clashed with the interests of Austria, Serbia and Montenegro. Italian admiral Paolo di Revel and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sonnino wished to pull out Italy from its inferior position relative to Austria-Hungary. On the other hand, Italy's pretensions aimed to ensure maritime and military domination in the Adriatic region.²⁴

²¹ Dragoljub R. Živojinović, *Amerika, Italija i postanak Jugoslavije 1917–1919*, Beograd 1970; Dragan R. Živojinović, *America, Italy and the Birth of Yugoslavia (1917–1919)*, New York 1972.

²² "The Americans in this period were a moral and political force which no contending side dared to irritate beyond certain limits. The Yugoslavs always tried to avoid any trouble and to keep the American authorities on their side in the dispute with Italy. In this they completely succeeded, helped by Italian shortsightedness, lack of wisdom and aggressiveness", D. Živojinović, *America, Italy and the Birth of Yugoslavia*, 305.

²³ Драгољуб Р. Живојиновић, *У потрази за империјом: Италија и Балкан почетком XX века*, студије и расправе, Београд 2013.

²⁴ Д. Живојиновић, *Улога адмирала Паола Таона ди Ревела у формулисању италијанске политике на Јадранском мору 1914–1919*, in: Д. Живојиновић, *У потрази за империјом: Италија и Балкан почетком XX века*, 51–118.

One of the first historians who opened the Adriatic Question was professor Andrej Mitrović, who believed that secret diplomacy (with the Treaty of London as an example) as an instrument of international policy contributed to the outbreak of the world conflict. The proclamation of public diplomacy from Moscow and Washington was a signpost showing an exit from the crisis. However, solving of the Adriatic Question relied again on secret diplomacy among the great powers, with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes consulted only at times. Italy's Prime Minister Nitti was the first to try to establish direct contact with the Yugoslav government (22 June 1919), thereby bringing an end to Sonnini's policy of ignoring the new neighbour.²⁵ Mitrović concludes that Italy, though sided with the victorious powers, had several weak points: it failed to secure any significant military victory, it faced an internal political crisis and opposition to the nationality principle. Italy worked to incite external and internal difficulties of the Yugoslav state – it helped King Nikola and Bulgarian komitadji, and conducted propaganda against the new state in Sofia, Budapest, Bucharest and Vienna.²⁶

Over the last two decades, the publication of archive records has stepped up, shedding more light on relations between Serbia and Italy. These are, principally, *Документи о спољној политици Краљевине Србије 1903–1914* ("Documents on Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of Serbia 1903–1914") – a seminal publishing project of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, carried out for several decades. Recently, the Archive of Serbia has been publishing records from the Consulate General of the Kingdom of Serbia in Trieste from 1884 to 1914, prepared by Miroslav Perišić, Svetozar Rajak and Jelica Reljić.²⁷

As a result of cooperation of Serbian historians with their colleagues from Italy, France and Bulgaria, the Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts has issued the collection of papers – *Italy's Balkan Strategies (19th–20th Century)*.²⁸ The editor Vojislav Pavlović highlighted the following: "Among the foreign influences in the Balkans, the Italian one was probably the last to express itself, but certainly not the least important. From the early 19th century, the Italian national movement, and later the Italian kingdom, was first a source of inspiration, and then a potential ally; finally, it would become an economic and political rival for the Balkan nations. Yet, the history of the two shores of Adriatic evolved in similar if

²⁵ Андреј Митровић, *Тајни контакти Нитијеве владе са југословенском делегацијом у јулу 1919. године*, Зборник Филозофског факултета VIII (Београд 1964) 733–771.

²⁶ Andrej Mitrović, *Italija i stvaranje Jugoslavije 1918. godine*, in: Naučni skup u povodu 50-godišnjice raspada Austro-Ugarske monarhije i stvaranja jugoslavenske države, Zagreb 1969, 263–273.

²⁷ *Generalni konzulat Kraljevine Srbije u Trstu: 1884–1914*, prepared by Miroslav Perišić, Svetozar Rajak, Jelica Reljić, Beograd, Arhiv Srbije, 2009; (*Consolato generale Delregno di Serbia a Trieste: 1884–1914*, redazione di Miroslav Perišić, Svetozar Rajak, Jelica Reljić, Belgrado, Archivio della Serbia, 2009).

²⁸ *Italy's Balkan Strategies (19th–20th Century)*, edited by Vojislav G. Pavlović, Belgrade, Institute for Balkan Studies of the SASA, 2014.

not identical stages”.²⁹ The edition covers topics from the Italian Risorgimento, through the activity of Giuseppe Garibaldi, the role of the Balkans and Serbia in Italian foreign policy until World War I, the Adriatic Question, to interwar relations between Italy and Yugoslavia, occupation of Greece and Albania, and the issues of post-war cooperation between Italy and the SFRY.³⁰

The topic of Serbian-Italian relations has not been exhausted and certainly offers new lines of research. A number of papers of contemporary historiography are dedicated both to political and cultural and other links between Italy and Yugoslavia in the period between the two world wars and after World War II.

²⁹ Ibid, 7–10.

³⁰ We point out to the papers of Ljiljana Aleksić Pejčević, *The Serbian Question in Italy's Balkan Policy until the First World War*, 81–102, Dragoljub R. Živojinović, *The War Aims of Serbia and Italy (1917)*, 137–158 and Dušan T. Bataković, *Essad Pasha Toptani, Serbia and the Albanian Question (1915-1918)*, 159–180.

Biljana VUČETIĆ

LA STORIOGRAFIA SERBA E I RAPPORTI TRA LA SERBIA E L'ITALIA

Sommario

La politica estera italiana verso la Serbia fino alla Prima guerra mondiale ha attraversato tre fasi: Orientale (liberazione nazionale e unificazione 1848-1870), Mediterraneo-coloniale (Triplice Alleanza del 1882 e albanofilia per controbilanciare la pressione dell'Austria) e Orientale-tripolitana (fine della politica coloniale in Africa e ritorno all'Adriatico, 1914). D'altronde, la politica estera del Principato serbo vide nell'Italia un possibile alleato. In alcune situazioni, la mediazione dell'Italia ha apportato alla Serbia risultati favorevoli (mediazione italiana per la tregua della guerra serbo-turca del 1876, ruolo mediatore dell'Italia nel boicottaggio diplomatico della Serbia nel 1903-1906, assistenza durante la Guerra dei Maiali del 1910, sostegno al principio "i Balcani ai popoli balcanici"). Tuttavia, la politica italiana si trovava a volte in contrasto con gli interessi della Serbia, come quando si oppose all'accesso al mare Adriatico per Belgrado, nel 1912, oppure quando si pronunciò contro l'unificazione jugoslava.

La storiografia serba si è soffermata su diversi argomenti della storia delle relazioni tra i due paesi. In primo luogo c'è l'analisi delle affinità e delle differenze fra il movimento nazionale serbo ed il Risorgimento italiano. Un altro tema molto discusso è l'atteggiamento dell'Italia in merito alla Questione d'Oriente. Il più grande contributo storiografico in proposito rimane quello di Ljiljana Aleksić Pejković. Un terzo filone di studio sulle relazioni serbo-italiane riguarda la politica dell'Italia nei confronti della Serbia nella Prima guerra mondiale, il suo atteggiamento verso la creazione del Regno dei Serbi, Croati e Sloveni e la questione adriatica. Il maggiore contributo allo studio di queste questioni è quello di Dragoljub Zivojinović e Andrej Mitrović. Ciononostante, numerosi episodi delle relazioni serbo-italiane rimangono ancora da studiare e approfondire.

Parole chiave: Serbia, Italia, storiografia, rapporti serbo-italiani.

Биљана ВУЧЕТИЋ

ПРЕГЛЕД СРПСКЕ ИСТОРИОГРАФИЈЕ
О ОДНОСИМА СРБИЈЕ И ИТАЛИЈЕ

Резиме

Спољна политика Италије до Првог светског рата према Србији, прошла је кроз три етапе: источну (национално ослобођење и уједињење 1848–1870, кад се опредељује за *status quo* у Источном питању), медитеранско-колонијалну (Тројни савез од 1882, албанофилија као противтежа притиску Аустрије) и источно-триполитанску (крах колонијалне политике у Африци и враћање ка Јадрану, до 1914). Спољнополитички програм Кнежевине Србије видео је Италију као још једног савезника међу великим силама, наклоњеног Србији. У појединим ситуацијама посредовање Италије донело је Србији повољне исходе (посредовање Италије за примирје у Српско-турском рату 1876, ангажовање Италије на страни Србије у дипломатском штрајку 1903–1906 године, помоћ током Царинског рата 1910, подршка принципу „Балкан балканским народима“). Међутим, италијанска политика налазила се и на страни супротној интересима Србије, рецимо спречила је излаз на Јадранско море 1912. године и противила се југословенском уједињењу.

Српска историографија се усмерила на неколико тема у оквиру проучавања односа Србије са Италијом. Прво је питање сличности и разлика српског националног покрета и Ризорђимента. Друга тема у оквиру српске историографије посвећене српско-италијанским односима је став Италије према Србији у оквирима Источног питања. Највећи допринос овој проблематици дала је Љиљана Алексић Пејковић. Трећа група питања српско – италијанских односа којима се бавила српска историографија је политика Италије према Србији у Првом светском рату, њен однос ка стварању Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца и Јадранско питање. На многа питања из ове групе одговорили су Драгољуб Живојиновић и Андреј Митровић. Тема српско – италијанских односа није исцрпљена и пружа нове правце истраживања.

Кључне речи: Србија, Италија, историографија, српско-италијански односи.